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Increasingly, the United States 
is confronted with a strategic 
environment of intense Great Power 
Competition and persistent hybrid 
threats where the energy sector can be 
used to leverage governments politically 
through potential energy market 
manipulation or—more dangerously—
via targeted attacks on energy 
infrastructure. While there are concerns 
regarding China, Iran, North Korea, and 
some non-state actors, Russia remains 
a very prominent hybrid threat actor 
on many fronts and in many regions—
some far away, others closer to home. 
As we seemingly enter a new era of 
potential Mutually Assured Darkness, 
the recent blackouts in Texas and other 
areas highlight that it is more than just 
the lights that go out. 
 Most will recall Russia’s aggression 
and attacks on Ukraine, which led to 
the first reported blackouts caused 
by a cyberattack in 2015. Russia’s 
deliberate hybrid campaign led to its 
illegal occupation of Crimea making 
the Kremlin an international pariah in 
the West and beyond. Nonetheless, 
its advancement of the Nord Stream 
2 pipeline both furthers its energy 
influence in Western Europe and 
attempts to weaken Ukraine in order 
to punish Kyiv for its steadfast goals 
to escape Moscow’s yoke and align 
with the liberal West. Russia’s hardball 





Climate & Energy Executive Orders
Energy Security Lessons
Nord Stream 2 Report
Ambassador Richard Morningstar
Battery Reactivity
While many Americans were distracted with other headlines 
in the fall and early winter closing out 2020, there were 
several reports of alleged Russian hacking into all levels of 
U.S. energy infrastructure and systems including into the 
Department of Energy.
antics go far beyond Ukraine and the 
previous incursions in Georgia, as 
Russia aggressively seeks to return a 
perceived sphere of influence into its 
fold. Volunteers are few. 
 Much closer to home, cyberattacks 
into our election apparatus and energy 
infrastructure—reportedly at the hands 
of the most sophisticated Russian-
directed hackers—paint a stark picture 
of our vulnerabilities, which Russia 
Continued on page 2
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undoubtedly seeks to exploit in order 
to achieve its objectives of returning to 
great power status and broadening its 
scope and influence on an international 
scale. While many Americans were 
distracted with other headlines in the 
fall and early winter closing out 2020, 
there were several reports of alleged 
Russian hacking into all levels of U.S. 
Continued from page 1 energy infrastructure and systems 
including into the Department of Energy. 
 Deterring our adversaries from 
conducting hybrid attacks will 
take a whole of government and 
comprehensive approach in partnership 
with the private sector, and also a 
determined team effort with our 
allies and other partners. The Naval 
Postgraduate School will do its part 
with its recently approved Center on 
LEARN MORE
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Combating Hybrid Threats, which will 
focus initial research efforts on Russia, 
energy, and naturally, hybrid threats in 
the maritime domain. We must do far 
more than keep the lights on.  
NPS's academic programs in Defense Energy are supplemented by a seminar series which 
provides a forum for leading voices within the field, practitioners, and other Defense Energy 
influencers. These professionals give presentations, engage in brown bag discussions, and 
facilitate informal gatherings that encourage Defense Energy faculty and students to discourse 
over current issues in Defense Energy, supplementing classroom teaching with practical, 
professional experiences. The Defense Energy Seminars Series is a permanent part of NPS's 
Defense Energy program, and a key to its real-world relevance. 
Defense Energy Certificate Awardees
Dr. Dan Nussbaum and the Energy Academic Group (EAG) congratulate Cohort III students for completing the 
Defense Energy Certificate, and also acknowledge their hard work and dedication to the program. Upon conclusion 
of the winter quarter, we conferred certificates to 24 students. Feedback from these talented students indicates a 
worth-while and “eye-opening” experience, with a practical application to address DoD needs.  
 EAG’s Defense Energy Certificate program is a graduate-level accredited certificate program consisting of four 
courses, offered via Distributed Learning on a pace of one course per quarter for four consecutive quarters. The 
program is open to all fed ral civili n employees and active duty military. It provides those working military and 
civilian employees th  opportunity to gain an understanding of the complex i ues facing the Operational nd 
Installation Energy segments of the DoD.  
 We are pleased to report that Coh rt IV began th  pr gram on 29 March 2021 with a capacity-filled class of 30 
students. Cohort Five is expected to begin on 28 March 2022 with an announcement scheduled for 1 October 2021. 
For more information, or to apply, email Kevin Maher at kjmaher@nps.edu.
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In this article I address three 
issues: climate change concerns of 
the new administration; geopolitical 
implications of a natural gas pipeline; 
and a recent development in 
assessing issues in hybrid warfare.
 Every new administration comes 
with its own priorities. For example, 
the Biden administration has 
reintroduced climate change as an 
aspect of National Security, reviving 
what has been an in-and-out topic 
ever since the 1990s when the U.S. 
Naval War College issued Global 
Climate Change Implications for 
the United States, which found that 
“Naval operations in the coming half 
century may be drastically affected 
by the impact of global climate 
change.” Later, in October 2003, 
the National Defense University 
published a report stating that 
“global warming could have a chilling 
effect on the military.” In 2018, the 
National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) addressed the vulnerabilities 
to military installations over the 
next two decades and warned that 
rising temperatures, droughts, 
and famines might lead to more 
failed states―which are “breeding 
grounds of extremist and terrorist 
organizations.” Now, President 
Biden’s Executive Order (EO) 
establishes climate considerations 
as an essential element of U.S. 
foreign policy and national security. 
The EO commissions a “National 
Intelligence Estimate on the security 
implications of climate change,” and 
it directs DoD to “develop plans 
to adapt to a warming world.” The 
recent announcements of Mr. Joe 
Bryan and Mr. Richard Kidd as 
senior officials in the Pentagon are 
clear implementations of these new 
policies. Mr. Bryan has been appointed 
as the Senior Advisor to the SECDEF on 
climate change; he was a former DASN 
for operational energy. Mr. Kidd is 
now the DASD (Environment & Energy 
Resilience), with a portfolio covering 
“enabling resilience and cyber-secure 
energy for weapon systems and 
installations, oversight of programs 
related to climate change, compliance 
with environmental laws, prevention 
of pollution, management of natural 
and cultural resources, and cleanup of 
contaminated sites, as well as energy 
resilience, risk, and performance.” 
He was formerly a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary within the Army Secretariat. 
I know them both as dedicated, 
articulate and committed civil servants, 
and look forward to working with them 
and their offices.
 The worldwide flows of natural gas 
are a hard-to-overestimate dimension 
of international politics and economics, 
and, as such, they play an important 
role in great power competition. Two 
recent developments in this sphere are 
noteworthy: the recently completed 
Southern Gas Corridor, and the almost 
completed Nord Stream 2 (NS2) 
natural gas pipeline. The Southern Gas 
Corridor routes natural gas from the 
Caspian to Europe, and one of its main 
goals is to reduce Europe's dependency 
on Russian gas by diversifying Europe’s 
energy sources. NS2 will double 
the capacity of the existing, parallel 
undersea route (NS1) from Russian 
fields to Germany (and then onwards 
to get to Europe). There is some 
concern that NS2 increases Europe’s 
dependence on Russia. In fact, the 
most recent NDAA speaks directly 
to this fact, and it imposes sanctions 
on some participants in the 
program. You can read about some 
of the EU-U.S.-Russia geopolitical 
tensions of NS2 in “Nord Stream 2: 
Implications and Outcomes for U.S.-
German Relations and the NATO 
Alliance “, here. 
 Finally for this article, I want to 
mention the establishment of a new, 
interdisciplinary research center at 
NPS that was initiated by the Energy 
Academic Group, the Center on 
Combating Hybrid Threats (CCHT). In 
an era of Great Power Competition, 
we face increased challenges from 
hybrid threats as adversaries seek 
to operate in the “gray zone” which 
falls short of full war, is less costly, 
and yet is an increasingly effective 
space to conduct hybrid operations 
and campaigns. The ongoing 
challenges from Russia, China, Iran, 
North Korea, and non-state actors 
pertaining to hybrid threats require 
greater interdisciplinary attention. 
The Center will have three pillars, 
namely research, education, and 
outreach, and will work closely with 
other departments and centers on 
the NPS campus such as the Center 
for Infrastructure Defense and the 
Cyber Academic Group. If you’re 
interested in this topic, please do 
not hesitate to reach out to me.
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On January 5, the Navy released a 
Blue Arctic, its “strategic blueprint” 
for the Arctic region in preparation 
for an increasingly accessible and 
navigable region. The document 
defines the Arctic region as “stretching 
from Maine in the North Atlantic across 
the Arctic Ocean through the Bering 
Strait and Alaska in the North Pacific to 
the southern tip of the Aleutian Island 
chain.” 
 The document follows the 2019 
Strategic Outlook for the Arctic, Arctic 
Roadmap 2014–2030, and 2009 Navy 
Arctic Roadmap. The blueprint opens by 
acknowledging the significant changes 
in the region, especially increasingly 
navigable Arctic waters as a result of 
rapidly melting sea ice. It states that a 
blue Arctic “will create new challenges 
and opportunities off our northern 
shores. Without sustained American 
naval presence and partnerships in the 
Arctic region, peace and prosperity will 
be increasingly challenged by Russia 
and China, whose interests and values 
differ dramatically from ours.” While the 
blueprint does not reference China’s 
claim as a “near-Arctic state,” the 2019 
DoD Arctic Strategy disputes the claim. 
With the increased investments and 
activities by China and Russia, the 
document prioritizes the need for 
sustained partnerships with allies within 
and outside the region. 
 The blueprint shows prioritization 
of operating more assertively across 
the region “to prevail in day-to-
day competition as we protect the 
homeland, keep Arctic seas free and 
open, and deter coercive behavior and 
conventional aggression.” This includes 
improving the Navy’s exercises and fleet 
synchronization above and underwater 
by “regionally posturing our forces, 
conducting exercises and operations, 
integrating Navy-Marine Corps-Coast 
Guard capabilities, and synchronizing 
our Fleets.” Continuing joint military 
exercises, like the submarine-focused 
ICEX, are essential to evaluate and 
enhance American preparedness for 
operations in the region. 
The crew of the Seawolf-class fast-attack submarine, USS Connecticut (SSN 22) during Ice Exercise (ICEX) 2020. 
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael B. Zingaro)
Navy Releases Strategic 
Blueprint for the Arctic
ENERGY POLICY
By Kristen Fletcher,  
Faculty Associate-Research,  
Energy Academic Group
"Without sustained American naval presence and 
partnerships in the Arctic region, peace and prosperity 
will be increasingly challenged by Russia and China, whose 
interests and values differ dramatically from ours."
LEARN MORE
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from defense.gov 
EAG Interns have prepared two 
Arctic reports available at:  
nps.edu/web/eag/intern-research 
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Between January 20 and February 
4, President Biden issued three 
Executive Orders (EOs) which prioritize 
climate at the center of U.S. foreign 
policy and national security and 
instruct executive agencies regarding 
energy and climate actions. The 
Executive Orders are:
• Executive Order 13900 ( January 
20, 2021): Protecting Public Health 
and the Environment and Restoring 
Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis
• Executive Order 14008 ( January 27, 
2021): Tackling the Climate Crisis at 
Home and Abroad
• Executive Order 14013 (February 
4, 2021): Rebuilding and Enhancing 
Programs to Resettle Refugees and 
Planning for the Impact of Climate 
Change on Migration 
EO 13900 calls for conservation of 30% 
of federal land and oceans by 2030; 
institutes a moratorium on new oil and 
gas leases on public lands and waters; 
and coincides with the United States 
reentering the Paris Climate Accord. 
 EO 14008 calls for the creation 
of a National Climate Task Force, 
which is chaired by National Climate 
Advisor Gina McCarthy, and includes 
senior White House officials and 
Cabinet-level leaders from 21 federal 
agencies including the Secretaries 
of Defense, Homeland Defense, and 
Energy. The Task Force will facilitate 
the organization and deployment 
of a government-wide approach to 
combat the climate crisis, including 
leveraging federal procurement to 
decarbonize the electricity sector by 
2035 and replace government vehicles 
with zero-emission vehicles. EO 14008 
reboots the Presidential Memorandum 
on Climate Change and National 
Security of September 21, 2016, and 
calls for an analysis of the security 
implications of climate change to be 
incorporated into defense planning 
along with deployment of clean energy 
technologies and infrastructure.
 Secretary of Defense Austin issued 
a statement noting that the Pentagon 
will begin incorporating climate analysis 
into its war-gaming and analysis efforts 
as well as featuring the issue as part 
of its future National Defense Strategy. 
DoD will analyze its own carbon 
footprint and spur the “development 
of climate-friendly technologies at 
scale.” Secretary Austin concluded 
the statement with “There is little 
about what the Department does to 
defend the American people that is 
not affected by climate change. It is a 
national security issue, and we must 
treat it as such.”
President Joe Biden signs one of the 17 Executive Orders he signed on Inauguration Day Wednesday, Jan. 20, 2021, in the Oval Office of the 
White House. (Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz)
Executive Orders Create 
National Priorities on 
Climate and Energy 
ENERGY POLICY
By Kristen Fletcher,  
Faculty Associate-Research,  
Energy Academic Group
LEARN MORE
The Climate Change EOs and 
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Article originally published February 23, 
2021 in RealClearEnergy and reprinted 
with permission. 
The recent extended electricity 
outage in Texas has spurred a sharp 
debate on how to prevent future 
disasters in Texas and other states. 
Much of this debate ignores the 
fact that few states have adopted a 
proactive approach to energy security. 
Instead, most have left energy security 
matters to market mechanisms and 
to Washington, neither of which can 
deliver on local needs. States would 
benefit from adopting energy security 
policies. In crafting these policies, 
they can learn from the tenets of 
international energy security policy 
as practiced by many countries with 
smaller populations and GNP than 
medium and large U.S. states.
 These lessons include the need for 
government involvement in energy 
security, the necessity of emergency-
supply plans, the importance of 
diversifying fuel sources, the need 
for energy storage and dual-fuel 
power plants, and legal protection of 
ownership and operations of critical 
energy infrastructure.
 Lesson one is that energy security is 
akin to national security, and markets 
alone can’t provide it. Accordingly, U.S. 
states need energy security policies. 
While market mechanisms and private 
companies can play the dominant 
role in energy production, transit, and 
marketing, the state must stay involved 
in ensuring that mechanisms are in 
place for energy security.
 Second, well-governed states 
develop and execute detailed 
emergency plans in case of disruptions 
of natural gas, liquid fuels, and 
electricity supplies. Most NATO 
member countries, for instance, have 
energy emergency-supply plans. These 
plans allow these governments to pre-
emptively shut down energy-intensive, 
non-essential industries, such as 
cement production, desalination plants, 
and some manufacturing.
 By doing so, governments can 
prevent grid collapse and ensure that 
those that need the supplies most, 
particularly residential customers, will 
receive energy supplies. As the recent 
bitter freeze loomed, Texas should have 
preemptively ordered such a shutdown. 
Instead, several days into the crisis, 
energy-intensive industries in Texas, 
like gas-liquefaction plants, chose to 
shut down. Texas and many other U.S. 
states rely on market mechanisms to 
direct such shutdowns, but the market 
mechanisms did not deliver. A simple 
emergency-response plan could have 
prevented the meltdown.
 Next, diverse fuel mixes enhance 
security of energy supply. Following the 
Texas outage, interested parties sought 
to blame specific energy sources such 
as wind and natural gas for the failure. 
It’s a good thing that Texas’s electricity 
is produced by multiple energy 
sources, but as foreign countries know, 
energy systems need back up and 






By Brenda Shaffer,  
Faculty Associate-Research,  
Energy Academic Group
These lessons include the need for government involvement 
in energy security, the necessity of emergency-supply 
plans, the importance of diversifying fuel sources, the need 
for energy storage and dual-fuel power plants, and legal 
protection of ownership and operations of critical energy 
infrastructure.
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mandate that natural gas companies 
store backup supplies, not leave it to 
the companies’ discretion.
 Israel, for instance, despite 
possessing, like Texas, vast natural 
gas resources in the ground, stores 
liquefied gas for emergency use. And 
some of the electricity power plants 
should be dual-fuel, so that when gas 
supplies are disrupted, they can easily 
transfer from one fuel type to another 
and keep generation going. The dual-
fuel plants are less efficient, so the 
private market tends not to install 
them. Again, it falls to governments 
to ensure some backup plants are 
available when needed. Most Eastern 
European nations possess dual-
fuel power plants to offset potential 
disruptions of Russian gas.
 While not connected to the Texas 
supply outage, future disruptions could 
be tied to foreign actors that acquire 
LEARN MORE
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Resolving the areas of 
contention between Germany 
and the United States is of 
the utmost importance early in 
President Joe Biden’s term. One 
of these disputes is the ongoing 
disagreements on the Nord 
Stream 2 undersea natural gas 
pipeline. This issue comes at 
a difficult time as Berlin is in a 
precarious position regarding its 
energy security outlook. To meet 
economic and environmental 
obligations after the shutdown of 
its nuclear power plants, Germany 
will depend on steady imports 
of natural gas; and Nord Stream 
2 will secure additional volumes 
from Russia. Ironically, this will 
also increase Russia’s political and 
economic leverage over Ukraine as 
well as several Central and Eastern 
European Allies dependent on 
Russian gas. The U.S. has voiced 
strong opposition to Nord Stream 
2, but Germany is determined to 
proceed with its construction, 
further complicating efforts to 
normalize relations between the 
two nations. This position paper 
provides three potential scenarios 
on Nord Stream 2, discussing 
the implications of each for U.S.-
German relations, as well as for the 
Nord Stream 2: Implications and 
Outcomes for U.S.-German Relations 
and the NATO Alliance 
NEW REPORT
LEARN MORE
Read the entire report  
on the EAG's website at  
nps.edu/web/eag/news
NATO Alliance. Ultimately, careful 
diplomacy and compromise 
solutions from Washington and 
Berlin offer the best potential 
for ameliorating trans-Atlantic 
relations during a fraught election 
year in Germany.
ownership in U.S. energy infrastructure. 
Most foreign countries enact laws to 
protect their strategic infrastructure 
from being acquired by potential hostile 
actors. For instance, Lithuania in 2012 
barred ownership of its energy and 
other strategic national infrastructure 
by companies that do not share a 
“trans-Atlantic orientation,” in an effort 
to prevent Russian ownership of its 
grids and ports. U.S. states need also 
to assess the risks from foreign actors 
and put legislation in place to protect 
essential energy infrastructure.
 Marketization of energy trade has 
had many worthwhile results, leading 
to greater supplies and lower prices 
of many forms of energy. However, 
U.S. states need to enact policies 
that ensure the reliability of those 
supplies, especially as most American 
communities plan expanded use of 
electricity. States are much better 
equipped than the vast federal 
government to provide for local 
security of supply of energy. Market 
mechanisms are not enough to get 
the job done. The public expects local 
governments to ensure secure energy 
supplies. When the lights go out, 
citizens blame their states, not private 
companies or Washington.
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In August 2020, the Energy 
Academic Group held an advanced 
energy security course for 
professionals in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey. The virtual 
course was co-sponsored with ADA 
University in Baku. One of the highlights 
of the course was an interview 
with (retired) Ambassador Richard 
Morningstar, founding chairman of 
the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy 
Center. Ambassador Morningstar held a 
number of positions over the last three 
decades leading major aspects of U.S. 
international energy policy, including 
U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy 
and U.S. Ambassador to the EU, and 
U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. His 
interview captures lessons learned on 
U.S. international energy policy and is 
an important primary document for 
students and researchers studying 
the intersection between U.S. foreign 
policy and U.S. international energy 
policy, Caspian energy, and the politics 
of the South Caucasus. In addition 
Morningstar explained “At that time, 
we were thinking about and we really 
wanted there to be a diversity of 
pipelines, not just pipelines going 
through Russia. We didn’t want to see 
pipelines going through Iran—but 
it was important that pipelines go 
west… We really wanted to emphasize 
and ensure the sovereignty of the 
new states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Central Asian countries.” In addition, 
“What was important is that this was 
a bipartisan policy. Republicans and 
Democrats both supported it. And 
it’s been consistent since that time. 
With all of the issues in the United 
States, all the fighting back and forth 
between Republicans and Democrats, 
our Caspian policy has been fully 
consistent for 25 years. And I think 
that’s been very important because it 
gave us credibility.” On the Southern 
Gas Corridor natural gas project, which 
brings gas from the Caspian to Europe 
and which Morningstar worked over a 
decade to help establish, Morningstar 
remarked, “I think that the Southern 
Gas Corridor has been an incredibly 
successful project.” This project brings 
the first new gas volumes in decades 
to Europe, versus pipeline projects that 
just reroute existing gas supplies.
Ambassador Richard Morningstar (retired), founding chairman of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center
Interview with Ambassador 
Richard Morningstar
ENERGY OUTREACH
By Brenda Shaffer, Faculty 
Associate – Research, Energy 
Academic Group
LEARN MORE
Watch the full interview at 
nps.edu/web/eag/august-12-2020
Read the full interview at the 
atlanticcouncil.org
Email Brenda Shaffer at  
eag_poc@nps.edu
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arise as a challenge to a system that 
causes assets and systems to fail. 
Here, experts use consequence 
models to estimate impacts brought 
by challenges. In contrast, threats also 
arise from flaws within our systems. 
Here, bad design or poor management 
can cause systems to fail. Flaws can be 
managed without knowing the failures 
or consequences they may cause.
 Taken together, these perspectives 
allow us to organize a comprehensive 
framework for vulnerability analysis. 
Specifically, perspectives relate to four 
technical fields, each exemplifying one 
of the “four horsemen of infrastructure 
vulnerability” that will come to your 
base to tell you that your energy 
system is vulnerable. A comprehensive 
vulnerability analysis should consider 
each perspective prior to making 
recommendations on how to improve 
resilience.
Risk Analysis: Risk analysis identifies 
predictable challenges to a system. 
The likelihood of a risk is modeled with 
probability and the consequences of 
system failure is explicitly measured. 
Risk analysis is the language of the 
insurance industry and actuaries.
Reliability Engineering: Reliability 
identifies predictable flaws in a system. 
The reliability of a system is informed 
Resilience is a “new” term creeping 
into military directives, but what 
does it mean and how do we use 
it to guide decisions? Earlier in the 
Resilience Corner, we described 
how achieving resilience means 
improving the robustness, extensibility, 
restoration, and adaptation of military 
systems. However, improving resilience 
is impossible without first knowing 
system vulnerability. 
 So, how do we identify 
vulnerabilities? My answer to this 
question hinges on the idea that 
vulnerabilities arise from how we model 
the predictability and source of threats. 
 There are at least two ways to model 
threat predictability. Predictability 
can be modeled with probabilities 
representing the likelihood of a threat 
(e.g., the return period for a flood). 
Predictability is also modeled with 
possibilities representing imagined 
events that are unlikely, but possible. 
In the military, we often consider 
possibilities through wargaming and 
exercises to see how people respond to 
ficticious situations.
 There are also two ways to model 
the source of threats. Threats can 
by determining the probability it will be 
inoperable given normal conditions. 
Reliability engineering focuses on 
updating poorly managed, out-of-
date, and faulty systems before they 
fail. Reliability is the language of 
systems engineers and engineering 
professionals.
Adversarial Analysis: Adversarial 
analysis deals with possible challenges 
to a system. While the likelihood 
of an adversarial attack can only 
be estimated with possibility, the 
consequences of an adversarial attack 
can be explicitly measured. Adversarial 
analysis is the language of military and 
security experts.
Safety Engineering: Safety deals 
with possible flaws in a system. 
Safety concerns itself with managing 
dangerous conditions and tries to 
identify protections and precautions 
that prevent failures from occurring. 
Safety is the language of safety 
professionals and human factors.
By Dan Eisenberg, PhD, 
Department of Operations 
Research, NPS
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The Energy Academic Group at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
has completed construction of 
a small-scale microgrid using low 
cost commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
parts. This microgrid facility will allow 
students to collect experimental 
data on the performance of different 
technologies for renewable generation, 
energy storage, and power distribution. 
The microgrid is housed in a 20’ 
standard shipping container which 
makes the system easy to transport 
for future experiments in different 
testing environments. Although 
the COTS components used in the 
microgrid differ from what students 
might see in a forward deployed 
operational environment, their 
open architecture and component-
agnostic nature makes them ideal for 
student experimentation; the COTS 
components used in the microgrid 
are designed to interface with a wide 
variety of hardware, so students will be 
able to integrate new components such 
as hydrogen or compressed air energy 
storage. Work is ongoing to improve 
the data collection capabilities of the 
microgrid for adavanced features such 
as monitoring the voltage of individual 
battery cells. Demonstrating COTS 
technologies in this microgrid lab may 
pave the way for future exploration or 
adoption of COTS energy technologies 
at CONUS DoD installations. Until 
then, the microgrid lab will serve as a 
valuable educational tool for students 
studying power electronics at NPS.
The microgrid is housed in a 20’ standard shipping container for easy to transport for future experiments in different testing environments. 
LEARN MORE






By Brandon Naylor, Faculty 
Associate-Research, 
Energy Academic Group
Space reserved for our Operation Energy Theses plugAll NPS resident students write a thesis or capstone project report as part of 
their curricular requirements. Many theses are unclassified and accessible 
on Calhoun—the Naval Postgraduate School's digital repository for research 
materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. To access 
theses which involve operational energy, please use the following link. New theses 
are added every quarter.
Operational Energy Research 
Available on Calhoun

View operational energy theses available on Calhoun: 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/
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Energy storage is an integral 
component of an increasingly 
electrified modern battlefield. 
This will result in a greater need 
for light-weight yet energy-dense 
storage systems. The increasing 
demand for these systems has 
resulted in the deployment 
of lithium ion (Li-ion) battery 
technologies across the force. 
The requirement to enable and 
protect the force on the modern 
battlefield, as well as minimize 
risks of collateral damage, places a 
premium on efficient and effective 
life cycle management of Li-ion 
battery technology. 
 Key life cycle considerations 
of Li-ion battery systems 
involve efficient and effective 
management of not only their 
energy storage benefits, but 
also their hazardous energy 
risks. Steve Sloop, a technology 
developer focused on battery 
materials recycling describes it as 
follows: “Li-ion battery reactivity can 
lead to explosion, even with state-of-
the-art recycling practices. To show 
the risk of fire and energy release with 
batteries, a single small cell can reach 
over 600˚C and melt aluminum when 
cut with a shearing action, like what 
occurs in an industrial shredder.” Spent 
Li-ion batteries add to hazardous 
waste streams generated by the 
force. The risks and costs associated 
with this waste stream could be 
reduced or potentially eliminated 
with implementation of deactivation 
technology.
 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 
OnTo Technology LLC (a DLA Small 
Business Innovation Research 
Contractor), and the Energy 
Academic Group are collaborating 
on concept stage exploratory study 
in the southwest region to identify 
and prioritize specific research 
development locations, activities 
and transition needs to enable 
implementation of new battery 
deactivation technology. 
Battery Reactivity, a Key Consideration
ENERGY RESEARCH
By Eric Hahn, Faculty Associate – 
Research, Energy Academic Group
Spent Li-ion batteries add to hazardous waste streams 
generated by the force. The risks and costs associated 
with this waste stream could be reduced or potentially 
eliminated with implementation of deactivation 
technology.
LEARN MORE 
Email Eric Hahn at  
ehahn1@nps.edu 
Calendar of Events
Connect with the Energy Academic Group
The Energy Academic Group is located in Room 101A, Spanagel Hall on 
the NPS campus in Monterey, California. A wide range of NPS faculty are 
affiliated with the energy program, actively participate in energy graduate 
education, energy executive education, and energy research. For questions, 
please contact one of the principal EAG faculty members: 
CHAIR 












an issue of Surge
If you would like to 
contribute an article or 
have your research/work 
published in the Surge 
newsletter, please contact 
Lois Hazard via email at 
lkhazard@nps.edu. 
Since 2013, NPS and the EAG supported a plethora of student thesis research in the area of 
energy. Publicly viewable student theses can be searched from the Resources page of the EAG 
website at nps.edu/web/eag/resources. The EAG’s extensive resources, intellectual capital, 
and connections with multi-disciplinary faculty and energy professionals provide students 
enhanced support for energy-related research. If interested in energy research, please reach 
out to the EAG team!
Interested in Energy-related Thesis Research?
Surge is published quarterly by 
the Energy Academic Group at 
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FOLLOW EAG ON LINKEDIN
linkedin.com/company/energy-academic-group
JUNE
June 29–July 2 
Critical Energy Infrastructure 
Protection (CEIP) Analysis Workshop  
Baku, Azerbaijan
The views and perspectives herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy (or Marine Corps).
